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I. INTRODUCTION
In recent years, violence and public housing have been closely linked in
political and popular cultures. To many, public housing symbolizes the dangers
of inner city urban life. Built mainly in the 1950s and 1960s to assist the poor and
working poor to escape “slum” conditions, most housing projects are clusters of
high rise towers that were placed in neighborhoods already in the midst of
significant social structural change. More recently, public housing design began to
include low slung garden apartments, but these also were built in neighborhoods
that traditionally were “slums” with high concentrations of many of the correlates
of violence.
In the years following the Second World War, crime rates in
neighborhoods with public housing sites had begun climbing, and rapid
population change and economic decline had changed the fortunes of

§ This research was supported in part by Grant 034898 from the Substance Abuse Policy
Research Program, Robert Wood Johnson Foundation. Several agencies generously provided data
for this project: the New York State Division of Criminal Justice Services, the New York City
Public Housing Authority, the New York City Department of Health and Mental Hygiene, and the
New York City Police Department. We owe special thanks to Phil Thompson for sharing the
NYCHA databases, Susan Wilt for providing access to injury epidemiology data from the NYC
DOHMH, and Tamara Dumanovsky for helping to launch the project and assemble the datasets.
Several people provided valuable research assistance, including Carolyn Pinedo, Nicole Mutter,
Greg Paulos, Melvin Geiger, and Clifton Edwards. All opinions are solely those of the authors.
*
Professor of Law and Public Health. Columbia University.
** Assistant Professor of Criminal Justice, Simon Fraser University
*** Research Analyst, Department of Epidemiology, Mailman School of Public Health,
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neighborhood residents for theworse. 1 In the last 20 years, the notion that public
housing is, by its physical and social design, a dangerous milieu, has been
reinforced by rare but widely publicized episodes of youth violence, sequential
drug epidemics, and elevated rates of drug-related violence. Starting with the
crack epidemic in the mid-1980s, the high rise towers of large, isolated, and
ominous public housing projects came to symbolize societal drug and crime
problems. Recent studies suggest that base rates of victimization and violent
offending are higher in public housing compared to other contexts, and that these
problems can be attributed in part to drug use and selling.2
The intense activity in Chicago public housing by drug gangs,3 and its
takeover in 1995 by the federal Department of Housing and Urban Development,
4
reinforced these images of public housing. Recent law and policy focusing drug
control policies on public housing has reinforced the connections between public
housing, crime and drugs.5 These connections are routinely revisited in the press
as a reminder of the persistence of drug problems in public housing.6
In response to these problems in large cities nationwide, the U.S.
Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) launched the Drug
Elimination Program (DEP). DEP funds were available only to public housing
authorities to address drug problems. Drug problems included drug selling, drug
use, and drug-related violence. The program was flexible and diverse, a reflection
1 See, for example, Alex Kotlowitz, THERE ARE NO CHILDREN HERE (1990); Nicholas Lemann,
THE PROMISED LAND (1991). Also, see earlier sociological works by Lee Rainwater, BEHIND
GHETTO WALLS (1966), Ulf Hannerz, SOULSIDE (1969), and James Garbarino, CHILDREN AND
FAMILIES IN THE SOCIAL ENVIRONMENT (1992).
2 Timothy Ireland et al., Violence Among Adolescents Living In Public Housing: A Two-Site
Analysis, 3 Criminology and Public Policy 3 (2003); Susan Popkin, et al., THE HIDDEN WAR:
THE BATTLE TO CONTROL CRIME IN PUBLIC HOUSING IN CHICAGO (2000); Tamara Dumanovsky et
al., Neighborhood Contexts of Crime in New York City’s Public Housing, Presented at the
September Research Institute on Neighborhood Effects on Low-Income Families, Joint Center for
Poverty Research, The University of Chicago and Northwestern University (1999). Recent efforts
by HUD to conduct victimization surveys in public housing projects suggest elevated rates, but
with a host of methodological artifacts and complexities. See, for example, Harold R Holzman
and Lanny Piper, Measuring Crime in Public Housing: Methodological Issues and Research
Strategies, 14 Journal of Quantitative Criminology 331 (1998); Harold R Holzman,
Criminological Research on Public Housing: Toward a Better Understanding of People, Places
and Spaces, 42 Crime and Delinquency 361 (1996).
3 See, for example, Sudhir Alli Venkatesh, AMERICAN PROJECT: THE RISE AND FALL OF AN
AMERICAN GHETTO (2000).
4 Judy A. England-Joseph, HUD's takeover of the Chicago Housing Authority, statement to the
Subcommittee on Housing and Community Opportunity, Committee on Banking and Financial
Services, House of Representatives, 1995.
5 See, for example, HUD v Rucker, infra note 23; The Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988 (Section
5101), infra note 21.
6 See, for example, N.R. Kleinfeld, With Drugs in Open, Elderly Live Behind Locks, New York
Times, May 2, 2004, at 41 (describing drugs and violence in Harborview Terrace Houses on the
west side of Manhattan, primarily by illegal tenants in a housing complex with a high proportion
of elderly residents).
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of the different needs and strengths of the local housing authorities. At its core,
DEP combined several strategies in a comprehensive design to prevent and
control drug use: police enforcement, drug treatment, drug prevention,
coordination of services with health and social service agencies, and development
of the social infrastructure of formal and informal supervision groups in the
housing authorities.
The New York City Housing Authority (NYCHA) launched its local DEP
program in 1990 to reduce drug use, drug selling, and drug-related crimes in
public housing sites. The local programs are collaborations between NYCHA
management and local tenant organizations and residents to design and implement
DEP activities. Supported activities include enhanced police protection, drug
treatment, drug prevention programs, youth and gang outreach, and community
organizing. Capital projects also are supported by DEP, such as lighting
improvements and installation of CCTV surveillance. Programs have been present
in more than 85% of the sites for one or more years since the program’s inception
in 1991, and funding reached $40 million in 1996. NYCHA has spent over $165
million on DEP over its seven years.
Despite this large investment, there has been surprisingly little research on
DEP efforts in New York City, or in DEP sites nationally.9 More generally,
research on drug and crime control efforts in public housing is very limited,10 and
only rarely tied to specific policy frameworks.11 The contradiction between the
severity of drug and crime problems in public housing and the relatively sparse
literature has left an important gap on the effects of drug control strategies in
public housing, neighborhoods and other small social areas.
NYCHA=s 344 projects provide a rich context for testing drug control
policies such as DEP. In this study, we examine the effects of the DEP
intervention at three levels of complementary theoretical relevance: the public
housing development itself, the neighborhood in which public housing is situated,
and the police precinct where the tract is located. We begin with a description of
the DEP Program as implemented in New York City, and then examine the
impacts of DEP interventions at each spatial aggregation.

9 Terence Dunworth and Aaron Saiger. Public Housing Drug Elimination Program Resource
Document, Executive Summary. Washington DC: U.S. Department of Housing and Urban
Development (1994).
10 Susan Popkin, et al., The Hidden War, supra note 2.
11 In contrast, see: Anthony Braga, et al., Problem-Oriented Policing in Violent Crime Places: A
Randomized Controlled Experiment, 37 Criminology 541-580 (1999).
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II. THE NEW YORK CITY HOUSING AUTHORITY
NYCHA is by far the nation=s largest housing authority,7 with an official
population of over 600,000 residents in 344 public housing developments.8 With
over 179,000 units, public housing constitutes approximately 8.5% of all rental
housing in New York City. Most (65%) of the city=s public housing
developments were built before 1970. Most developments are large: only 9%
have fewer than 100 units. Most of these smaller developments were built after
1970. In contrast, thirty-three percent of all public housing developments in New
York City have more than 1,000 units.
Public housing is not randomly distributed across the five boroughs of
New York City, nor is it randomly sited in the city’s neighborhoods. Over eightyfive percent of all public housing in the city is in three boroughs: Brooklyn,
Manhattan and the Bronx. Although dispersed outside the commercial center in
Manhattan, public housing is spread across most (53) of the city’s 75 police
precincts. This distribution reflects, in part, the decisions on where to locate
public housing and the success of locally organized opposition in the wealthier
neighborhoods. For example, only a few public housing developments were
constructed in Queens, a largely middle class, residential area, and the largest
cluster of public housing in Queens is in the Rockaways C on the ocean side of
Kennedy Airport C an area that is geographically much closer to Brooklyn than to
the center of Queens. Staten Island has only ten public housing developments,
and these are concentrated in the borough=s densely populated North Shore, near
the ferry terminal.
In Manhattan, most developments are located above 110th St. or below
midtown on the Lower East Side, well removed from the city’s wealthiest
neighborhoods and its commercial centers. Brooklyn has the most public housing
in the city, with the largest concentrations in the heavily minority neighborhoods
of Brownsville, Bushwick and East New York. Particularly for the larger
developments in the “outer boroughs,” such as Queensbridge, Morrisania or
7 In comparison, the Chicago Housing Authority (CHA) administers 40,462 units. After these, the
largest PHAs include Philadelphia with 22,229 units; Baltimore with 17,119; and Boston with
14,400 units (U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development, Housing Authority Profiles).
8 Official population counts of public housing residents tend to undercount the total number of
people living in public housing at any given time. Tenants are required to register family and
income information with the Housing Authority annually. These figures are used to confirm
eligibility for public housing, and in some cases are used to determine rents. Because of these
administrative guidelines, tenants do not always report all household members to the Housing
Authority. These Aunofficial@ residents may be family members or friends moving in for an
extended period, or men living in otherwise female-headed single-parent families. This
complicates analyses that rely on these official statistics. Comparing 1980 and 1990 census
population numbers with NYCHA tenant counts for public housing developments whose
boundaries correspond to census block groups shows that official population numbers are
consistently lower than census numbers B on average, NYCHA population numbers were up to
30% lower than census counts.
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Brownsville, public housing tends to ecologically dominate the surrounding areas,
suggesting that some areas are “public housing neighborhoods.”
Table 1 shows that public housing developments are sited in census tracts
with higher crime rates than other areas. The average annual homicide count from
1985-96 in census tracts with public housing projects is more than three times
higher (1.87 per year) compared to tracts without public housing.9 Figure 1
shows that homicide rates were persistently higher over time in tracts with public
housing, and remained higher in 1996, after the city’s overall rates had sharply
declined.
Table 1 also shows the extent of social disadvantage in tracts with public
housing sites. Compared to non-public housing tracts, these census tracts have
higher rates of households receiving public assistance, households below the
poverty level, female headed households with children, renters, and minority
population. They tend to have fewer high school graduates, persons in managerial
or professional jobs, and persons working or in the labor force. They are more
racially heterogeneous, and their population density is greater.
Table 2 shows the size and characteristics of public housing developments
for the period from 1985-96, the years when we had detailed information on
tenant characteristics. The total population has declined in recent years, but has
remained poor and non-white. Household density has declined slightly, but the
percentage of seniors and children below 10 years of age has increased. The
percentage of families on welfare has grown, as has the average duration of
residency. This suggests stability in the population, although at a rate where
households have fewer resources that would help them eventually move to other
housing contexts. With more children per household and long durations of public
housing tenancy, it seems unlikely that the social or human ecology of public
housing will change in the near future.

III. THE DRUG ELIMINATION PROGRAM
NYCHA first sought DEP funds from HUD in 1989, and a small pilot
program was funded in 1990. A far larger program was supported starting in
1991; by 1995, DEP was present in most of the public housing developments in
New York City. Funding levels for the various components of DEP are shown in
detail in Table 3, and are summarized in broader categories in Table 4.
The primary goal of DEP was to reduce drug use, drug selling, drugrelated crime and collateral crime problems by strengthening both formal and
informal social control in public housing developments. Increased police
presence and targeted prosecutions were the mechanisms to increase formal social
control. The primary public security program was Operation Safe Home (OSH).
9 The rates per 1,000 persons are .41 in tracts with public housing and .19 in tracts without public
housing.
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OSH created intensive patrols in and around public housing sites, while the AntiNarcotics Strike Force (ANSF) received grant funds to support special
prosecution activities primarily to evict tenants with drug arrests. For the first two
years, slightly less than one dollar in three went to police patrols, through OSH.
By the third year, almost half the budget was allocated to OSH; by 1995, more
than half the funds went to OSH. ANSF funding was modest but stable
throughout the study period, but remained a fraction of the law enforcement
budget.
Stronger tenant organizations and increased resident patrols were the
primary strategies to strengthen informal social control. NYCHA tenant
organizations were encouraged to become active in producing security through
the creation of Drug Elimination Committees, Tenant Patrols, and Community
Center Programs. Over the years, DEP also offered services and programs to
address issues more indirectly related to the reduction of drug-related crime, such
as a Domestic Violence Program, a Career Training Program, and arts and sports
activities.
The percentage of the program allocated to demand reduction programs
dropped sharply beginning in 1994, as program funding more than doubled. Drug
abuse treatment and prevention services received a declining share of the budget
over the course of DEP, from more than one third of the 1991 budget to less than
three percent in 1996. The decline is striking, from $5 million in 1991 to about $1
million in 1996. Tenant patrols, designed to engage residents of public housing in
the co-production of security, were modestly but stably funded throughout the
program. But the share of total DEP funds allocated to tenant patrols also
dropped sharply as the program grew in 1994. Social and community services
rose in 1994 as the program expanded, although these funds were diffused across
14 separate categories. When spread across the NYCHA system, the funded
amounts per development were inconsequential.
The expansion of DEP in 1994, and the sharp shift in funding priorities to
strengthen OSH, reflects broader shifts in law enforcement strategy and social
policy in New York City in 1994, following a change in mayoral administration.
The emphasis on street-level enforcement in New York City has been widely
described10 and analyzed.11 The budget trends reflect not just the shift in policy
choices; there were substantive changes in strategy, tactics, and policing style
beginning in this time that provoked strong public reactions, and raised
contentious claims about the role of policing to bring about citywide crime

10 See, for example, William Bratton and Peter Knobler, TURNAROUND (1998); Judith A Greene,
Zero Tolerance: A Case Study of Police Policies and Practices in New York City, 45 Crime and
Delinquency 171 (1999).
11 George Kelling and Catherine Cole, FIXING BROKEN WINDOWS (1996); New York State
Attorney General, Stop and Frisk Report, 1999; Jeffrey Fagan and Garth Davies, Street Stops and
Broken Windows: Terry Race, and Disorder in New York City, 28 Fordham Urban Law Journal
457 (2000).
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reductions.12 Declining investments in drug abuse treatment and prevention was
part of this administration’s generalized social policy shift and theoretical reorientation that de-emphasized demand reduction strategies.13
Below, we describe details of the major components of DEP: Operation
Safe Homes, the ANSF, Tenant Patrols, and Drug Treatment.14
A. Operation Safe Home
Operation Safe Home (OSH) was considered the “linchpin” of NYCHA’s
Drug Elimination Program.15 OSH focused on increasing the presence of
uniformed officers and law enforcement activities in public housing developments
with the goal of providing a more secure living environment for its residents by
combating serious crime. The program emphasized “vertical patrols” in public
housing to clear problem areas, and subsequent maintenance to keep areas safe.
OSH teams patrolled indoor and outdoor areas, conducted systematic building
patrols – lasting from several weeks to several months – and worked with
management teams to improve physical security at targeted sites (e.g., repairing
broken lighting and door locks).
For the early part of DEP, OSH involved two separate groups, Target
Teams and Maintenance Teams. “Target Teams,” consisting of five officers and
one sergeant, were deployed to selected developments in an attempt to “take
back” a development building by building, often conducting vertical patrols in the
larger buildings. OSH officers encouraged residents to form tenant patrols, and
provided training and assistance to these patrols. Officers also reported any
instances of physical damage or vandalism to management staff who were
expected to attend to the maintenance needs of the target developments. The
Target Phase lasted for up to a month and a half, after which a “Maintenance
Team,” usually two officers, were given periodic patrols at the recently
“completed” developments.16 Maintenance Teams were responsible for insuring
that the work of the Target Teams remained effective after they moved on to a
new development.
The number of police officers participating in OSH increased from 48 in
12 Bernard Harcourt, ILLUSION OF ORDER (2001); Andrew Karmen, NEW YORK MURDER
MYSTERY (2000); Malcolm Gladwell, THE TIPPING POINT (2nd edition) (2000).
13
At the same time, though, the Courts created and expanded a network of specialized treatment
courts designed to divert drug offenders from criminal prosecution to substance abuse treatment.
See, Greg Berman and John Feinblatt, Greg Berman & Aubrey Fox, Institutionalizing Innovation:
The New York Drug Court Story, 27 Fordham Urban Law Journal 277 (2000). But these
programs was open to all eligible criminal defendants, and public housing residents effectively
lost their dedicated pathway into drug treatment.
14
For more detailed descriptions and analyses of the program components, see: Jeffrey Fagan et
al., Drug Control in Public Housing: The Impact of the Drug Elimination Program of The New
York City Housing Authority. Final Report, Robert Wood Johnson Foundation, July 2003.
15
NYCHA DEP Grant Application, 1991.
16
NYPD Operation Safe Home, 1994 Year End Report.
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1991, to 81 in 1994. Each Police Service Area (PSA)17 was assigned one or two
Target Teams and one Maintenance Team, giving the area between five and ten
OSH officers by 1994. In 1995, when the Transit Police and Housing Police were
merged with the NYPD, OSH grew from 81 officers and nine sergeants, to 400
officers, with 57 sergeants.18 Following a change in mayoral administration in
1994, the OSH budget doubled the next year, and increased again by 50% the
following year. It remained at that level through the end of the decade.
B. Tenant Patrols
Through the Tenant Patrol Program, NYCHA involved residents in
resisting drug-related crime in their developments. Volunteer residents, under the
direction of a tenant patrol supervisor, walked the grounds of their public housing
development in an effort to deter criminal activity. The tenant patrol supervisors,
part-time employees of NYCHA, were funded through DEP – and were usually
former tenant patrol volunteers. In case of emergency, supervisors had the ability
to contact local police through the Citywide Telephone Monitoring System. In
addition to crime deterrence, the patrol had an “early intervention” component,
which identified and addressed common maintenance problems like broken lights,
thermostats, and unclean lobbies.
NYCHA envisioned the patrols as the “eyes and ears” of the housing
police and considered the tenant patrols one of the more important aspects of the
Drug Elimination Program, in that it helped to create a bridge between the police
and the community.19 The tenant patrols worked with local police precincts and
public housing management to identify problem areas on public housing grounds,
providing a basis for cooperation between residents, NYCHA staff and the local
police. As developed under NYCHA DEP, the level of activity of the tenant
patrols corresponds with that of OSH. During OSH vertical patrols, recruitment
efforts for the tenant patrols are increased.
NYCHA’s Tenant Patrol Division had 15 staff members. The staff
members’ duties included coordinating and conducting training sessions for
volunteer tenant patrol supervisors, and providing support for the supervisors
once the patrol was under way. After the start of DEP, these efforts were
organized around the OSH interventions. As OSH expanded, NYCHA found that
the Tenant Patrol Division staff was not able to keep up with the tenant patrol
volunteers’ demand for support. By 1993, tenant patrol volunteers requested that
each target site have it’s own tenant patrol staff. In response, subsequent DEP
budgets included salaries for 20 community coordinators (field associates) and
supervisory staff. As a result, the Tenant Patrol Program’s budget expanded
seven-fold, from $165,000 in 1994 to $1.1 million in 1995. By 1999, the Tenant
17 Under the Housing Authority Police Department, PSAs were administrative units comparable
to NYPD police precincts. For example, the South Bronx is PSA 7.
18 NYPD, Operation Safe Home Report, July 1995.
19 NYCHA DEP Grant Application, 1995.
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Patrol Program had 213 part-time (20 hours per week) tenant patrol supervisors,
working with 6,650 volunteers at 795 buildings; active tenant patrols were in
place at 144 separate developments.
Despite this growth, the budget share for this component of DEP remained
a small fraction of the total DEP budget, and was dwarfed starting in 1995 by the
budget for police interventions. Over the study period, OSH consumed 45.5% of
the total DEP outlay, compared to 1.8% for tenant patrols.
C. The Anti-Narcotics Strike Force
The Anti-Narcotics Strike Force (ANSF) was a team of attorneys,
investigators and support staff that was created in 1988 within NYCHA’s Law
Department. Its focus was the eviction from public housing of persons involved
in the illegal distribution and sale of narcotics.
Prior to 1971, NYCHA could evict tenants with only one month’s notice,
and without a hearing. In response to a 1967 challenge to these evictions,
NYCHA entered into a consent decree which required a multiple-stage review
process, including legal notice, representation, a NYCHA hearing and appeals, for
all eviction cases (Escalera vs the New York City Housing Authority, 1971).20
Recent changes in federal law provided an enabling framework for ANSF
prosecutions,21 and the law has been strengthened over the decade since DEP was
created. In 1996, President Clinton announced the “One Strike” policy –
essentially restating the provisions of the 1988 Anti-Drug Abuse Act – to
encourage public housing authorities to apply the 1988 provisions to speed the
eviction of residents involved in criminal activity. Also in 1996, a Federal judge
granted NYCHA the right to use the Bawdy House Law – originally intended to
allow evictions for vice, particularly prostitution – in cases involving drug
traffickers.22 Most recently, the U.S. Supreme Court upheld this provision in the
case of HUD v. Rucker: a 9th Circuit case involving the eviction of a 63-year old
20 Pedro and Rose Escalera were tenants in New York City public housing. They filed a class
action in 1967 under 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201, 2202 and 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against NYCHA, alleging
violations of the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause and the United States Housing Act
of 1937, as amended, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1401. Before trial, the parties entered into settlement which
later was incorporated into a decree, known as the “Escalera Decree,” Escalera v. New York City
Housing. Authority, 425 F.2d 853 (2d Cir. 1970).
21 The federal Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988 (Section 5101) strengthened existing public housing
lease provisions by including language in the leases to the effect that: “A public housing resident,
any member of the resident’s household, or a guest or other person under the resident’s control
shall not engage in criminal activity, including drug-related criminal activity, on or near public
housing premises . . . and such criminal activity shall be cause for termination of tenancy” (HUD,
April 1991). A resident does not need to be convicted of criminal activity to be considered in
violation of Section 5101.
22 N.Y.McKinney's RPAPL §§ 711 and 715. See, Valerie D. White, Note, Modifying the
Escalera Consent Decree: A Case Study on the Application of the Rufo Test, 23 Fordham Urban
Law Journal 377 (1996); Bill Alden, Procedure to Evict Drug Dealers Eased, Modification of
1071 Consent Decree Granted. New York Law Journal, April 22, pg 1.
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grandmother and her family – based on the drug arrest of her mentally disabled
granddaughter several blocks away from public housing grounds.23
Between 1991 and 1993, ANSF dedicated a total of two investigators, out
of a team of 13, to cases arising solely from DEP targeted sites. In 1994, ANSF
staff expanded capabilities, adding a total of five investigators through DEP
funds.
D. Drug Abuse Treatment and Prevention Program
DEP’s drug abuse intervention and prevention programs focused on two
target populations: adolescents and pregnant or post-partum women. The main
goal was to provide treatment services for drug-addicted pregnant and postpartum women and treatment and prevention services for drug-addicted or at-risk
adolescents, through three strategies: (1) NYCHA hired community outreach
workers to identify drug-addicted residents, (2) the Department of Health
provided counselors to prepare drug-addicted residents for treatment, and (3) the
program contracted out to local treatment service providers for the treatment
component of the program. These programs included health education, individual
counseling and group activities. In addition to this primary focus, the program
provided referrals to treatment services for drug-addicted residents not included in
the program’s target populations.
Funding declined over the years for these services. NYCHA allocated
$4.2 million in 1991 to fund pilot programs in three large public housing
developments: Brownsville, East Harlem, and the South Bronx (Mott-Haven and
Morrisania). These funds were not spent during the first DEP year, but instead
were re-allocated over subsequent years. By the end of 1993, NYCHA had
established contracts for treatment services for the three target sites and wanted to
expand the search for treatment providers citywide. No further funds were
allocated for these contracts; NYCHA continued to use the 1991 fiscal funds for
most treatment contracts.24 By 1997, NYCHA stopped contracting directly with
drug treatment service providers and the emphasis of the program shifted to
outreach and referrals in November 1992.
Slow referral rates illustrated the problems with this component of DEP.
23 Dep't of Housing. & Urban Development v Rucker, 535 U.S. 125,(2002) (holding that the
federal Anti-Drug Abuse Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1437d(l)(6) (1994), requires lease terms that give local
public housing authorities the discretion to terminate the lease of a tenant when a member of the
household or a guest engaged in drug-related activity, regardless of whether tenant knew, or
should have known, of the drug-related activity). In New York, public housing officials have
similar discretion to evict tenants following conviction of co-residents on drug charges. See, also,
Escalera v. N.Y. Hous. Auth., 924 F. Supp. 1323, 1343-45 (S.D.N.Y. 1996).
24 Difficulties in the administration of the program contracts were the stated reason for the
decision to decelerate treatment funding. In particular, NYCHA had trouble ensuring that
providers were fulfilling their contracts. For example, one treatment provider, which NYCHA had
contracted with in August 1995, had provided no services through December of 1995. NYCHA
considered initiating default proceedings against the contractor.
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By January of 1993, a total of 139 residents had been referred to drug treatment
providers. However, not until 1994 were residents referred to programs under
contract with NYCHA. NYCHA reported that between July and December 1994,
215 pregnant and post-partum women and 140 adolescents from the three pilots
sites were referred to contracted programs. An additional 305 residents – not part
of the program’s target population – were referred to other treatment providers.
Between July and December 1996, 14 pregnant and post-partum women from
seven different neighborhoods, 296 adolescents, and 105 other residents were
referred to treatment services. In 1998, 801 cases that were identified as having
substance abuse problems during Termination of Tenancy action proceedings
were referred to the Drug Abuse Outreach, Referral, and Placement Program by
NYCHA management.

IV. RESEARCH METHODS
To assess DEP impacts, we use mixed effects panel models to estimate the
effects of DEP on crime and violence in and around public housing from 1985-96,
controlling for drug enforcement and the social and structural contexts of public
housing and the surrounding neighborhoods. We estimate the effects of DEP
three ways: first, as a dummy variable representing the period before or after DEP
implementation in 1991; second, as a continuous (random) effect measured by
DEP dollar investments (with zeros for the years before DEP); and third, as
discrete dosages of its primary components of policy and theoretical interest –
OSH and the tenant patrols. Since a significant portion of DEP funds
supplemented law enforcement efforts (through OSH), we include drug arrests as
a measure of law enforcement that was underwritten by DEP funds.
A. Study Sample
The study sample is 184 public housing sites, 53.5% of the 344 NYCHA
housing developments. We excluded 64 public housing developments (PHDs)
that do not fit the traditional definition of public housing.25 After accounting for
25 Three categories of public housing were excluded from the sample: buildings that are part of
the Multi-Family Home Ownership Program (MHOP), senior-only projects, and scattered-site
housing. Under MHOP, NYCHA rehabilitated apartments in city-owned buildings and offered
them for sale to working families in public housing. See, Glenn Thrush, “Promises, Promises,”
City Limits June/July (1997). Although these sites are administered through NYCHA, because
they are part of a home-ownership program they are not comparable to other public housing sites,
and are excluded from this study. Senior-only projects were excluded from the sample because
these projects introduce different questions and considerations for understanding crime in public
housing. Most family projects have a senior population ranging between 10% and 15%.
Excluding senior-only sites does not have much impact on the age distribution of public housing
residents. In 1990, for example, the senior population when all 233 projects are included totals
14.6%, while in the sample of 182 projects seniors account for 13.6% of the 1990 population. The
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administrative consolidations26 among the 280 PHDs, the final sample totals 184
PHDs. The final study sample includes all family PHDs in New York City built
before 1985.
B. Variables, Measures and Data Sources
1. Drug and Crime Indicators
NYCHA Incident Reports. Until the NYC housing and transit police
departments merged with the NYPD in 1995, NYCHA’s housing police
maintained independent records for public housing developments. Complete and
consistent data is available for 1985 through 1994 for all NYCHA housing
projects. These data are available in two forms. For the entire 10 year period,
aggregated incident reports are available for each site. These reports include total
number of incidents reported to housing authority police broken down by UCR
Index Crime codes for Part I and Part II offenses. For the years 1985-1994
detailed incident reports are available. These files include details for each
incident including location (inside a building, or outside, in public area, a
sidewalk adjacent to the development, etc.), along with information on weapons,
and characteristics of the victim and perpetrator (where applicable), and whether
or not the victim is a resident.
NYPD Precinct Arrest and Complaint Reports. We contrast trends in drug
and crime indicators for the NYCHA developments with the surrounding contexts
of the local police precincts. There are several reasons to do this. First, arrest and
crime reporting trends are significantly influenced by policy and strategy
undertaken at the local police level. Prior to the consolidation of the NYPD and
the Housing Police Department, enforcement and crime indicators were
commingled between local NYPD precincts as well as the Housing Police.
final exclusion is scattered site projects. These are generally single, walk-up, buildings that have
been rehabilitated, and are indistinguishable from other buildings in the area. Buildings that are
part of the West Side Urban Renewal (WSUR) – buildings throughout the Upper West Side of
Manhattan managed by the Housing Authority – are examples of these scattered-site projects. For
purposes of comparability, this study also excludes developments built after 1985. The few
developments built after 1985 are distinct from other public housing sites. They are much smaller,
and tend to be rehabilitations of existing buildings or scattered sites.
26 Administrative consolidations of public housing developments generally take one of two forms.
The first kind of consolidation occurs with larger public housing developments. Although built
contemporaneously, certain PHD sites combine two separate developments. A second type of
consolidation is an amalgamation. This occurs when a new building is added to an already
existing development. Amalgamations include developments such as Red Hook I & II,
Queensbridge North & South, Throggs Neck & Addition, and Millbrook & Extension. In some
cases, crime complaint and arrest reports are combined for two or more projects due to geographic
proximity. Because data are combined for two or more developments, there is no way to
determine in which PHD a specific incident occurred. Because there is no way to determine the
exact site corresponding to the incident reports, tenant characteristics are consolidated across these
projects, and they are considered one site for the purpose of this study.
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Second, precinct indicators provide an estimate of larger ecological trends in
crime in the neighborhoods surrounding the NYCHA developments. In previous
research on crime in NYCHA developments (Dumanovsky et al., 1999), we
estimated hierarchical models of crime that included precinct as well as
development indicators: the precinct variables were (instead of are) significant in
each of the models.
Complete NYPD Precinct Arrest and Complaint Reports were available
from 1984 through 1996. These data are aggregated numbers of UCR crime
categories (Part I and Part II) by precinct. The precinct totals for Part I offenses
do not include Housing Authority Police Department incidents. NYPD numbers
for Part II offenses may include housing and transit figures after 1979. Since the
consolidation of the Housing Authority Police with the NYPD in 1995, public
housing complaint and arrest data are no longer maintained by NYCHA.
Homicide. We use homicide victimization data from the Office of Vital
Statistics and Epidemiology, New York City Department of Health and Mental
Hygiene, to construct homicide counts for each census tract and police precinct
from 1986-96. Homicides are geocoded based on the last known address of the
victim.27 The Vital Statistics records are compiled from death certificates
completed by the Office of the Medical Examiner. Homicides are classified by
the Medical Examiner using ICD-10 codes, and integrate investigation
information from the New York City Police Department.
2. Social Structural Variables
a. NYCHA Tenant and Site Characteristics.
NYCHA interviews public housing tenants annually, and maintains yearly
records of tenant characteristics for each project. This data is available from 1968
through 1996, aggregated by project and race: white, black, Hispanic and other.
The data items are relatively consistent across time. They include total number of
families, total population, average income, number of minors, number of elderly,
number of welfare families, one-parent families, employment (number of families
with 2 or more persons employed), average tenancy, and number of minors
broken down by age groups.
Public housing site characteristics were obtained from NYCHA’s archived
records. Measures include total number of buildings, housing units, whether a
development is reserved exclusively for the elderly, and the borough, community
27 In some cases, the location of the homicide may be some distance from the victim’s residence.
In a separate study, we examined Medical Examiner records to determine the distances from home
to location where the body was recovered. For 80% of young males 15-24 killed during 1987-92,
their bodies were recovered within one mile of their homes. We did not examine this for all
homicides in the sample, although we have no empirical or theoretical reason to assume that the
findings would differ for other demographic groups. Accordingly, we equate the victim’s
residence with the location where the body was recovered.
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district, and police precinct for each project.
b. Tract and Precinct Social Structural Characteristics.
We included measures of social and economic factors that reflect
contemporary theory regarding neighborhood, “place” and violence, theories that
incorporate not just the structural deficits of social areas but also their dynamic
processes of social control.28 We selected 18 tract-level variables from the 1980,
1990, and 2000 Census files, and sorted them into seven constructs that reflect
theoretically relevant dimensions of ecological or neighborhood risk. Dimensions
include: poverty, racial residential segregation, social control, population mobility
(anonymity), labor force participation, housing structure, and immigration. All
data were aggregated at the housing development, census tract, and precinct
levels. The various constructs were created for each of the three census years, and
were then interpolated for the interceding years.
Social Control. We computed two dimensions of social control. The first
captured the extent of supervision of young people within neighborhoods,
including (1) the concentration of youth population, (2) the percent of femaleheaded households with young children, and (3) the ratio of youths to adults. The
second dimension examined population size and change, including (1) the overall
size of the population and (2) residential stability and turnover, based on length of
residence.
Poverty. We computed three indicators of poverty: (1) percentage of
households with incomes below the poverty level (2) percent of households
receiving public assistance, and a Gini coefficient to measure inequality of
household income of that tract relative to other tracts in the City.
Labor Market Participation. Labor market participation and human
capital within the tract were measured with several variables: (1) employment
rates, (2) percent employed in professional or managerial jobs, (3) the percent of
the adult population over 25 with a high school education, and (4) the overall
labor force participation rate (i.e., those working and those seeking work).
Racial Residential Segregation.
We used a measure of racial
fragmentation to characterize segregation and population heterogeneity within
census tracts.29 Residential racial fragmentation is computed as 1 - ((%black)2 +
28 See, for example, Robert J. Bursik, Jr., and Harold Grasmik, NEIGHBORHOODS AND CRIME
(1993); Jeffrey D. Morenoff et al., Neighborhood Equality, Collective Efficacy, and the Spatial
Dynamics of Urban Violence, 39 Criminology 517 (2001); Robert J. Sampson et al., Assessing
“Neighborhood Effects:” Social Processes and New Directions in Research, 28 Annual Review of
Sociology 443 (2002); Jeffrey Fagan and Garth Davies, The Natural History of Neighborhood
Violence, 20 Journal of Contemporary Criminal Justice 121 (2004).
29
According to 1990 Census data for New York, African Americans are far more likely than
Hispanics to live in racially segregated areas. We computed an index of racial fragmentation for
New York, based on methods developed by Charles Lewis Taylor & Michael C. Hudson, WORLD
HANDBOOK OF POLITICAL AND SOCIAL INDICATORS (2nd ed.) 216 (1972). Racial fragmentation is
a measure of the racial heterogeneity within an area, and is computed as:
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(%white)2 + (%Hispanic)2 + (%other)2).
Housing Structure and Market Conditions. Three dimensions of housing
were computed: (1) vacancy rates: the percentage of vacant housing units, (2)
overcrowding: the mean number of persons per room in residential units, and (3)
the percent of housing units that are owner-occupied or rented.
Immigration. Two dimensions of immigration include linguistic isolation
and whether the head of the household was foreign-born.
B. Data Analysis
The general analytic model estimates DEP effects on drug-related and
other crime indicators. Control variables include drug enforcement, and the social
structural characteristics of the housing project, tract or precinct, depending on the
model. DEP and drug enforcement measures are lagged by one year. We
estimate separate models for violent and property crimes in housing projects and
police precincts. We estimate models for homicides to assess DEP effects in
public housing developments. We included interactions of DEP with the social
structural characteristics in each unit of analysis to better isolate the effects of
DEP on specific dimensions of crime risk.
In the tract and project models, we control for crime rates in the
surrounding areas to account for spatial diffusion.30 For tracts, we use the data for

1 - ((P)2)
Where P = proportion of each race within the spatial unit.
We divided census tracts into quintiles of this index. African Americans are more likely to reside
in the most homogeneous tracts, while Hispanics are far more likely to live in racially
heterogeneous areas:
Quintile*
1 (Most segregated)
2
3
4
5 (Least segregated)

30

% African Americans
33.74
23.25
25.32
27.34
20.26

% Hispanic
5.63
13.01
27.68
36.32
32.09

For example, Fagan and Davies found evidence of spatial diffusion of homicide from housing
developments to their surrounding neighborhoods in the Bronx, one of New York’s five boroughs
(counties), for example, Jeffrey Fagan, & Garth Davies, Crime in Public Housing: Two Way
Diffusion Effects, in ANALYZING CRIME PATTERNS : FRONTIERS OF PRACTICE (V. Goldsmith et al.,
eds.) 121 (1999). Dumanovsky et al. also found that crime rates in public housing were
dependent on the crime rates in the surrounding neighborhoods. See, Tamara Dumanovsky,
Jeffrey Fagan and J. Philip Thompson, The Neighborhood Context of Crime In NYC’s Public
Housing Projects, Presented at the September Research Institute on Neighborhood Effects on
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the surrounding police precinct. For the housing project estimates, we also use
the crime rate in the surrounding police precinct. For this analysis, we would
rather have used tracts, but some larger public housing sites occupy one or more
census tracts. To avoid this isomorphism and confounding, we relied instead on
precinct crime rates. Although heterogeneous units with ambiguous social
meaning, precincts have the advantage of being the administrative unit where
policing policies are implemented and managed. Because of the large size of
precincts, we did not include a spatial control in the analyses of precinct-level
effects.
We used mixed effects overdispersed Poisson regression models with an
autoregressive covariance structure to estimate the impacts of DEP on crime and
violence rates in and around public housing.31 There are inherent difficulties
associated with linear (OLS) regression to analyze per capita crime rates for
aggregated units such as census tracts or precincts.32 Accordingly, we use a
modified Poisson regression approach to resolve this problem, where the Poisson
models of counts are transformed into models of per capita offense rates through
the inclusion of logged population as an independent variables in each of the
models.33
All models were run in using the GLIMMIX macro in the SAS
Generalized Linear Model procedure.34 We specify both fixed and random effects
to simulate a hierarchical panel design or growth curve model.35 We include fixed
effects for project and neighborhood characteristics, fixed effects for prior year
indicia of violence and crime, drug enforcement in the prior year (lagged), and the
social and economic indicia of the various ecological contexts. We include
random effects for time (to account for within-neighborhood change over time)
and a quadratic term for time, and random effects to account for the time-varying
contributions of DEP funding over the panel.
We include a Moran’s I statistic36 to assess spatial autocorrelation in the
Low-Income Families, Joint Center for Poverty Research, The University of Chicago and
Northwestern University (1999).
31 A potential difficulty with the Poisson specification lies with the assumption that the variance
is equal to the mean, a condition often encountered in event (count) data that are customarily
overdispersed (where the variance exceeds the mean, as often is the case when there are large
numbers of zeros in the observations).
32 See, for example, D. Wayne Osgood, Poisson-Based Regression Analysis Of Aggregate Crime
Rates, 16 Journal of Quantitative Criminology 21 (2000).
33 Wayne Osgood, id.
34
The procedure is PROC MIXED, applying the GLIMMIX macro for generalized linear models
with mixed effects. SAS, Inc., Cary, NC. See, for example, Judith Singer, Using SAS PROC
MIXED to Fit Multilevel Models, Hierarchical Models, and Individual Growth Models, 24
Journal of Educational and Behavioral Statistics 322 (1998)
35
See, for example, Judith Singer, id; William Greene, ECONOMETRIC ANALYSIS (5th edition)
(2000).
36 Moran's I is a comparison of the value at any one location with the value at all other locations
in adjacent (first order) or nearby (second order or higher) spatial units. Moran's I requires an
intensity value for a crime point (represented here as the centroid of the census tract). This point is
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crime measures and as a control for crime rates in adjoining areas.37 Spatial
autocorrelation also permits analyses of the displacement and diffusion of drugrelated violence into the surrounding neighborhoods.
Finally, we included a measure to account for the endogeneity of crime
and social disadvantage within each spatial unit (public housing site, tract, and
precinct). The measure is the predicted value from a Poisson regression of the
crime (or homicide) count in the initial year in each series (1986), predicted from
the social structural variables.

V. RESULTS
A. Descriptive Statistics
Social and economic characteristics of tracts, precincts, and housing
projects are shown in Tables 5 and 6. These measures are the average of 1980 –
2000 census measures. Tracts populations range from 10 to 25105, with a mean
population of 3,446 persons. Precincts obviously are larger, with populations
ranging from 23,021 to 225,027, and an average population of 95,624 persons.38
Public housing developments have populations that range from 10 to 7,411, with a
mean population of 2267.4 (σ = 1,577.5).
There are some revealing measures in Table 6 about NYCHA’s public
housing developments. The developments in the sample for this study are quite
large, averaging more than 10 buildings per site, and number that no doubt is
pushed higher by the small number of very large projects with multiple buildings.
Since we excluded consolidations and amalgamations, the large size of these
projects is noteworthy. More than 40 percent of the population are minors below
18 years of age, and 13.75% are seniors. Tenure averages more than 15 years, a
remarkably long and stable period of residence for most families. But officially
reported incomes are extremely low, averaging $12,525 per family per year.
Nearly one in three families receive either “welfare” (TANF) or other forms of
public assistance. Fewer than five percent of the households in public housing
then assigned an intensity value, in this case the count of crimes within that tract. The Moran's I
result varies between -1 and +1. Values closer to +1 indicate high degrees of clustering of similar
values, either high (positive) or low (negative). Conversely, values closer to -1 demonstrate
dispersion, where areas with high values are surrounding by neighbors with low values, and vice
versa. A Moran’s I of 0 suggests that spatial autocorrelation is absent, that event occurrence is
random.
37
These are first order estimates. We acknowledge the importance of second order spatial
influences in recent empirical work, although we do not include second order measures since they
may confounded with policing or DEP activities in those spatial units. See, Jeffrey D. Morenoff et
al., Neighborhood Equality, Collective Efficacy, and the Spatial Dynamics of Urban Violence,
supra note 28.
38
The Central Park precinct has a tiny population but some crime. The models in the sections
following were unaffected by excluding this precinct.

XXX]

FAGAN, DAVIES AND HOLLAND

18

have two adults in the home who are employed. One family in five is a singleparent family with minor children. Just as populations in public housing are
under-reported to avoid violations of NYCHA contracts and rules, there are strong
incentives to engage in informal economic activity and avoid other sources of
income that might jeopardize eligibility if known.
B. Data Reduction
For each of the three spatial aggregations, we used principle components
factor analysis to create a smaller number of theoretically meaningful covariates
from the 18 separate measures. As discussed earlier, these dimensions are a
priori constructs that capture structural features of neighborhoods that are
correlated with variations in crime rates. Factor analyses were completed for each
year in the panel, and the factor scores serve as time-varying covariates in the
models of DEP effects. To simplify and illustrate display, Table 7 shows the
factor derivations for tracts and precincts for 1990, and Table 8 shows factor
derivations for the public housing developments, also for 1990.
For tracts and precincts, factors vary in their explained variance. Poverty
and inequality factors are strong, explaining 88.5% of the variance for tracts, and
92.9% for precincts. Anonymity and housing factors are the weakest, with
explained variance ranging from 51.9% to 66.4%.
For public housing
developments, we constructed two factors, and use single measures for other
covariates in the model. Explained variance for a poverty factor and a social
control factor are shown in Table 8.

C. Estimates of DEP Effects
For each unit of analysis, we estimated models of DEP effects using
overdispersed mixed effects Poisson regressions. We introduce a quadratic time
component to better fit a model to the curvilinear distribution of crime over the
study period. We control for the endogeneity of social structure and crime at the
start of the time series by estimating a regression of social structure on crime rates
for the baseline year (1986) at each unit of analysis, and including the predicted
value from that model as a predictor in the panel analyses. And, as mentioned
earlier, we use an offset of the logged population for each unit to approximate an
analysis of per capita crime rates.
We use three different measures to estimate DEP effects: (a) a binary
measure set at 0 for the years preceding DEP and 1 for the years in the panel
when DEP was in effects, (b) a measure of total DEP funding for each year in the
series, set at 0 for the years preceding DEP, and (c) specific estimates of the
effects of OSH and Tenant Patrols, based on DEP investments in these specific
components. We limited the components analysis to these two programs due to
multicollinearity between these two components and the ANSF and Drug Services
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components. We could not model project-specific interventions, since many of
the DEP components were implemented in wide areas encompassing several
public housing developments. For example, in the later years of DEP, some
programs were borough-wide programs.39 For the tract and public housing
developments, we also include measures of crime in the areas surrounding areas
for the tract and public housing components. For the latter, we use the crime rate
in the precinct where the development is located. We would have preferred a
smaller unit, such as the surrounding census tracts or some other definition of
“neighborhood.” But some developments were larger than one tract or straddled
the borders of two tracts, complicating the boundary decision. DEP effects were
lagged by one year, as were the effects of drug arrests.
1. Precinct Effects.
Separate analyses examined DEP effects on property and violent crimes.
We used UCR crime categories to classify crimes into each category.40
Table 9a shows the models for DEP effects on violent crimes. For all
three measures, DEP interventions significantly reduced crime rates over time.
The effects of the control variables vary by DEP measure, so there is no clear
picture of the effects of factors such as drug arrests or the concentration of public
housing in a precinct. In all three models, the social structural covariates suggest
that concentrations of structural risk are correlated with higher violence rates.
The analysis of DEP components suggests that these effects are specific to
OSH interventions. More aggressive police patrol, coupled with police efforts to
sustain the initial crime reduction contacts through the “maintenance teams,”
significantly contributes to lower violence rates. The effects of tenant patrols,
designed to strengthen informal social control, does not appear to affect violence
rates at the precinct level.
Of course, precincts are complex places, and there are many confounding
and unobserved factors that might drive these models. There are two
contradictory findings in the investment and components analyses that complicate
the interpretation of DEP effects on precinct-wide crime rates. First, the fewer the
number of public housing sites, the higher the violent crime rates. DEP was
present in the public housing sites only, and its effects on the surrounding areas
are uncertain. Accordingly, we cautiously view the effects on crime rates as
concentrated in the public housing sites, since DEP was specific to those areas.
But violent crime rates were higher in precincts with higher concentrations of
population in public housing. This may be a project size proxy, since the
population concentration reflects the presence of very large developments that
39

See, Jeffrey Fagan et al., Drug Control in Public Housing, supra note 14.
Violent crimes included reported and verified felony crimes of robbery, rape, other sex crimes,
murder, manslaughter, kidnap, and assault. Property crimes included reported and verified felony
crimes of larceny, motor vehicle theft, and burglary.
40
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often dwarf the surrounding areas. Crime problems are more severe in larger
projects,41 and this variable may be capturing the influence of the overall higher
crime rates in precincts where developments are spatially concentrated.
The effect of DEP on property crime rates is clearer. Table 9b shows that
DEP interventions are significant in all three models, including the components
model. Controls for public housing sites in the precinct are not significant for the
property crime models, and drug arrest are significant in only one instance. In the
components model, both OSH and tenant patrols are significant, but in opposite
directions. It is not hard to understand why these two components should work
against one another, since these investments moved in opposite directions over
time. But why these effects – limited to public housing sites – should influence
precinct-level property crime rates is a more difficult question. There is little
modifying evidence to suggest that these effects are specific to public housing
sites, such as the concentration of public housing in the precincts.
2. Tract Effects
Here, we are limited to analysis of homicide victimization rates, since geocoded crime data are not publicly available for analysis of other crime measures.
The results of the tract analysis in Table 10 are consistent with the precinct
analysis. DEP effects are large, significant, and in the expected direction. In the
components analysis, OSH significantly predicts lower homicide rates, but tenant
patrols are not a significant predictor of homicide rates. These models control for
the effects of homicide in the surrounding census tracts.
The dummy variable for whether the tract contains a public housing site is
significant in the binary and components models, but the coefficient is negative.
Accordingly, tracts with public housing sites have overall higher homicide rates
compared to other tracts, as shown graphically in Figure 1. In this table, the
beneficial effects of DEP are evident, even after we control for base rate
differences in homicide risk in public housing sites over time, and for homicide
rates in surrounding census tracts.
This analysis also shows that drug sale and drug possession arrests are
associated with higher homicide rates in census tracts. This counter-intuitive
effect is not surprising in the context of street-level drug markets. Higher drug
arrests are a marker for higher violence rates in both neighborhood studies42 and
city-level analyses.43 Drug markets often stable and institutionalized, despite their
41 See, for example, Dumanovsky et al., Neighborhood Contexts of Crime in New York City
Public Housing, supra note 30.
42 Fagan and Davies, The Effects of Drug Enforcement on the Rise and Fall of Homicide in New
York City, 1985-96, Final Report, Grant 031675, Substance Abuse Policy Research Program,
Robert Wood Johnson Foundation (2002).
43 Graham Ousey and Matthew R. Lee, Examining the Conditional Nature of the Illicit Drug
Markets-Homicide Relationship: A Partial Test of the Theory of Contingent Causation. 40
Criminology 101 (2002); Eric Baumer et al., The Influence of Crack Cocaine on Robbery,
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illicit activity and the potential harms from drug abuse.44 Disrupting markets
introduces instability, and such instability often is the spark for lethal violence.45
High rates of arrests may have the short-term effect of destabilizing drug markets
by removing social controls exerted by drug organizations intent on keeping
neighborhoods stable to avoid problems with the police.46 Accordingly, drug
enforcement may have a churning effect on drug markets that invites instability
and conflict. When drug offenders are removed via arrest, they were quickly
replaced by a supply of young men whose income potential seemed far better in
illegal work than in legal work. The competition among new sellers and newly
emerging organizations often is a fertile context for renewed and recurring
violence.47
3. DEP Effects in NYCHA Developments
There were no significant effects of DEP interventions in the housing
projects themselves, either on violence or property crime rates. Table 11a shows
the results for the analysis of DEP effects on violence. The positive coefficients
for the violence rate in the surrounding precinct suggests that project crime rates
are significantly influenced by what happens in the surrounding social context.
Drug possession arrests in the projects also appear to influence violent crime in
two of the models, perhaps suggesting a demand-side suppression effect on drug
Burglary, and Homicide Rates: A Cross-City, Longitudinal Analysis, 35 Journal of Research in
Crime and Delinquency 316 (1998); Richard Rosenfeld and Scott H. Decker, Are Arrest Statistics
a Valid Measure of Illicit Drug
Use? 16 Justice Quarterly 685 (1999).
44 See, Judith Matloff, Whose Neighborhood? New York Times, July 14, 2002, for a detailed
account of a northern Manhattan neighborhood where several drug sellers took strong measures to
keep their neighborhood safe and avoid attention from the police. Several studies suggest that
drug enforcement removes established drug sellers from established territories, from
organizational positions in drug organizations, and from stable business relationships with
customers. The vacuum created by aggressive drug enforcement is quickly filled by competing
drug selling groups, and new sellers arrive to establish business relationships with active buyers
seeking new sources of drug supplies. But, when several groups or individuals compete to fill
these vacuums, the possibility arises for disputes and conflicts that are settled by violence. Also,
when organizations are destabilized by arrests, internal organizational conflicts may arise as group
members compete to assume higher positions in their organizations that were vacated following
arrests and convictions. Again, such internal instability may be resolved by violence.
45 See, for example, Paul Goldstein, et al.,Crack and Homicide in New York City, 1988: A
Conceptually-Based Event Analysis, 16 Contemporary Drug Problems 161 (1990); Phillippe
Bourgois, IN SEARCH OF RESPECT (1995); Richard Curtis, The Improbable Transformation Of
Inner-City Neighborhoods: Crime, Violence, Drugs, And Youth In The 1990s, 88 Journal of
Criminal Law and Criminology 1233 (1998);
46 See, for example, Robert Jackall, WILD COWBOYS (1997)
47 Bourgois, supra note 45; Robert Jackall, WILD COWBOYS, id; Sudhir Alli Venkatesh,
AMERICAN PROJECT (2000); Jeffrey Fagan and Deanna L. Wilkinson, Guns, Youth Violence and
Social Identity, in Youth Violence (M. Tonry and M.H. Moore, eds.), 24 Crime and Justice 373
(1998).
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markets due perhaps to increased police activity focused less on sales than on
drug possession. Table 11b shows no effects of either DEP or drug arrests or
precinct crime rates on property crimes in public housing.
We suggest caution in comparing these models to the previous ones, given
differences in measurement and data sources. Recall that the measure of crime in
this analysis is taken from NYCHA incident reports, and its validity may differ
from police or public health data used in the previous analyses. At the same time,
any measurement error in this series is stable over time within sites, so estimates
of within-site changes in crime rates are likely to be stable. Accordingly, we
regard these results are reliable, and measurement error may have only a minor
influence on the size of the coefficients.
D. Summary
Table 12 provides a summary of the estimates of DEP effects on violence
and property crimes in and around public housing. The absence of effects within
public housing is less surprising in the context of how DEP funds were allocated
and applied by the NYPD. DEP was focused on housing sites, but also was
sufficiently diffused in the NYPD’s broader administrative units – police service
areas, or PSA’s – to provide resources that benefited law enforcement generally.
Seen this way, DEP was an important and strategically valuable supplement to the
NYPD’s strategic response to a particularly acute violence and crime epidemic.48
It allowed the police to focus not just on crimes in public housing, but in the
surrounding areas, as well. This strategy is consistent with the reality that crime
problems in public housing are reciprocally tied to crime problems in the
surrounding areas.49
But the absence of measurable and positive effects within public housing
speaks to the one-sided nature of the enforcement strategy. The policing strategy
was well-supported and active both within public housing and the surrounding
areas. The non-enforcement components of DEP were targeted specifically
within public housing sites: tenant patrols and drug treatment for its residents.
These were poorly funded and the efforts diluted, considering NYCHA’s vast
landscape. These low funding levels per site may have limited the development
and effectiveness of the non-enforcement approaches. Moreover, the reaction of
minority communities to the NYPD’s aggressive police tactics may have led to
adverse responses by residents to the intensive drug patrols, animating their
48 See, for example, George Kelling and William Souza, Do Police Matter? An Analysis of the
Impact of New York City=s Police Reforms (2001), http://www.manhattan-institute.org/cr_22.pdf,
visited March 14, 2003. Kelling and Souza see New York’s crime decline as the result of the
adoption of a strategy of aggressive policing of social and physical disorder via “zero tolerance”
policies and high rates of misdemeanor arrests, which in turn had prophylactic effects on crime
rates.
49 Dumanovsky et al., Neighborhood Contexts of Crime in Public Housing, supra note 30; Jeffrey
Fagan and Garth Davies, Crime in Public Housing, supra note 14.
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withdrawal from their own participation in social control and security.50 The
failure to mount viable interventions that directly touched on the drug problems,
social and economic lives, or normative orientations of NYCHA residents may
explain their withdrawal from social regulation, and in turn, the absence of DEP
effects within projects. In the next section, we discuss the reasons why.

VI. CONCLUSION
DEP was launched in 1990 at the peak of New York City’s epidemic of
lethal violence, much of which was animated by the explosive growth of streetlevel drug markets.51 DEP was launched concurrently with other strong crime
control measures, most prominently “Operation Safe Streets.”52 Within two years
of the launch of DEP, and Operation Safe Streets, crime rates began to decline in
the City.53 Homicide and non-lethal injuries, a reliable measure of criminal
violence that is independent of police reporting influences, declined slowly in
1992 and 1993, and then began a precipitous decline that lasted through the end of
the decade. Apportioning the reduction to DEP, other crime control measures, a
general decline in drug epidemics, or to a secular decline in violence and crime
due to economic or other social forces, is a conceptual and empirical challenge
and a contentious public policy debate.
In this study, we attempted to isolate the effects of DEP as one such policy
change. Using official records, we also show how formal social control – drug
arrests, primarily, conducted by special teams – contributed to the reduction of
crime and violence in the areas surrounding public housing, but appeared to have
little influence on the public housing sites they targeted. Based on this trend, we
draw lessons about DEP and about social control in public housing.

50 Jason Sunshine and Tom R. Tyler, Moral Solidarity, Identification with the Community, and
the Importance of Procedural Justice: The Police as Prototypical Representatives of a Group’s
Moral Values, 66 Social Psychology Quarterly 153 (2003).
51 Richard Curtis, The Improbable Transformation of Inner-City Neighborhoods: Crime,
Violence, Drugs, And Youth In The 1990s, 88 Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology 1233
(1998); Phillippe Bourgois, IN SEARCH OF RESPECT, supra note 45; Ansley Hamid, The Political
Economy of Crack-Related Violence,” 17 Contemporary Drug Problems 31 (1990); Bruce D.
Johnson, et al., Drug Abuse in the Inner City: Impact on Hard-Core Drug Users and the
Community, 13 Crime and Justice 9 (1990).
52 See, for example, Andrew Karmen, NEW YORK MURDER MYSTERY, supra note 2; Michele
Sviridoff, et al., The Neighborhood Effects of New York City’s Tactical Narcotics Team on Three
Brooklyn Precincts: Evaluation of the Tactical Narcotics Teams (1992).
53 Jeffrey Fagan et al., Declining Homicide in New York: A Tale of Two Epidemics, 88 J. Crim. L.
& Crim’l’gy 1277 (1998),; Karmen, supra note 2.
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A. Drug Control as Leveraged Social Control
Public housing in New York City accounts for a sizable portion of housing
in many poor neighborhoods, and in some communities it is the primary type of
housing.54 Although crime rates sometimes differ in public housing compared to
the surrounding area, public housing developments exert a strong influence on the
neighborhoods surrounding them, but so too do those neighborhoods influence
crime within the housing developments they surround. Also, the correlates of
crime in public housing are not necessarily those found in the city as a whole, or
in other poor urban areas.55 Accordingly, the embeddedness of public housing in
broader ecological dynamics of their surrounding neighborhoods is an empirical
fact that bears on the impacts of the DEP program.
The diffusion of social order and patterns of social exchanges in public
housing “neighborhoods” suggests that the fates of persons living in public
housing and persons living in their surrounding areas are tightly linked. Policy
decisions that located public housing in specific neighborhoods, which themselves
already were burdened by concentrated poverty, racial segregation, and weakened
mechanisms of informal social control, placed those burdens de facto on the
residents of public housing. This history of urban development reciprocally
shaped neighborhood ecologies and the fates of public housing developments.56
The effects of more recent policy decisions concerning changes in welfare policy,
housing policies, and public housing eligibility are still unknown. But, together
with well-publicized changes in police intervention strategies in New York City,57
housing policy decisions that target drugs and crime held out the promise to
significantly improve the ecology of poor neighborhoods.
DEP must be viewed, then, not just in its ability to root out and suppress
drug and crime problems in public housing, but in its ability to foster sustainable
changes in the capacity for social control among public housing residents. The
first goal – to root out crime and drug problems – was pursued through strong
investments of DEP funds in Operation Safe Homes, increasing patrol strength
and focusing its resources in pubic housing. OSH was coupled with special
prosecutions of public housing residents to intensify its deterrence efforts.
The second goal – strengthening informal social control by increasing
resident participation in patrol and other collective action projects – was informed
54 Peter Marcuse, Interpreting Public Housing History, 12 Journal of Architectural and Planning
Research 240 (1995); Dumanovsky, et al., Neighborhood Variation in Crime in Public Housing,
supra note 30; Susan Saegert, Gary Winkel, and H. Swartz, Social Capital and the Revitalization
of New York City’s Distressed Inner-City Neighborhoods, 9 Housing Policy Debate 17 (1998).
55 Tamara Dumanovsky, Neighborhood Context of Crime in Public Housing, supra note 30;
Garth Davies, Social Ecology and the Diffusion of Crime and Violence In and Around Public
Housing in New York City (doctoral dissertation) (2003).
56 Peter Marcuse, Public Housing History, supra note 54.
57 Willam Bratton and Peter Knobler, TURNAROUND (1998); George Kelling and Catherine Coles,
FIXING BROKEN WINDOWS (1996); Fagan and Davies, Street Stops and Broken Windows, supra
note 11.
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by theories that emphasize the importance of social regulation and collective
efficacy in reducing crime.58 DEP pursued this goal, for a time, by investing in
tenant organizations and social services that would enhance the capacity of
citizens to exert social control by (a) building social ties between citizens and (b)
strengthening ties between citizens and law enforcement.59 The results of these
processes were designed to strengthen forms of informal social control to reduce
crime and drug problems. In other words, DEP was designed to promote the
expansion of social capital by increasing the capacity for supervision.
B. Diffusion of Efforts in a Political Context
When interviewed, residents reported that drug and alcohol problems
improved in public housing, and that crime and unwarranted police harassment
also declined during this time.60 Physical and social disorder also waned as a
perceived problem in and around many of the public housing sites included in
these surveys. But residents said that these improvements were unrelated to DEP
programs, and that policing under DEP was largely unchanged from previous
eras. Residents reported that their involvement with the police, as well as social
ties among residents, remained unchanged, and few respondents reported general
improvements in their perceived safety. Social capital – as measured in these
interviews by the extent of local social ties and citizen interactions – either
declined or remained unchanged in most public housing sites. Thus, residents
generally were unwilling to attribute improvements in the problems of drugs,
crime and disorder as linked to better policing, stronger tenant activity, or closer
ties among public housing residents.
Thus, the good news of perceived improvements in tenants’ lives is
tempered by the fact that the sources of these improvements were un related to
DEP, nor to other measurable or sustainable changes in social interactions or
social organization among public housing tenants. The goal to strengthen social
capital and informal social control involved transfer of some burden of social
control over time from police to citizens. Social control is strongest when citizens
partner with legal actors to enforce laws.61 In DEP, the balance of social control
functions remained primarily the province of the police, and these efforts were

58 Robert J. Sampson, et al., Neighborhoods and Violent Crime: A Multilevel Model of Collective
Efficacy, 277 Science 918 (1997).
59 Robert J. Bursik, Jr., and Harold Grasmick, NEIGHBORHOODS AND CRIME (1993); Sampson et
al., id; Wesley Skogan, DISORDER AND DECLINE (1990); Ralph B. Taylor, BREAKING AWAY FROM
BROKEN WINDOWS (2001).
60 See, Jeffrey Fagan et al., Drug Control in Public Housing, supra note 14. In this study,
interviews were completed with 752 respondents including residents and NYCHA staff in 62
NYCHA developments located in 19 neighborhoods, in 1998-2000. Of these 752, 87.3% were
NYCHA residents.
61 See, for example, Charles Tittle, CONTROL BALANCE (1996).

XXX]

FAGAN, DAVIES AND HOLLAND

26

diffused throughout the department, often with harsh effects.62 Despite the
intention to address crime and drug problems in public housing, police
internalized DEP funds as part of an overall strategic facelift for the department.
The disproportionate allocation of DEP funds to enforcement and the
relatively smaller and more diluted investments in tenant programs (informal
social control), were noted by residents. In contrast, DEP resources for tenant
social and preventive programs were diffused throughout NYCHA’s public
housing sites.
The programs were generally underfunded, thematically
inconsistent, and not created with an eye toward permanence or even
sustainability. In key informant interviews,63 law enforcement officials, NYCHA
administration, and tenant leaders all described DEP a program that was primarily
a supplement to ongoing policing programs, that was indistinguishable from the
routine policing tactics in public housing, and that only casually and haphazardly
supported social developmental or preventive programs.64 They characterized
Operation Safe Homes DEP funds as a means to expand policing, not to develop
new forms of patrol that reflected the reality of public housing or its unique crime
problems. Under DEP, no special programs were created, no new initiatives were
developed or tested, and nothing sustainable apart from everyday command-andcontrol policing was developed or sustained under this program.65
Police tactics in this era were controversial and racialized, and the racial
imbalances in policing often were flashpoints for social tension conflict between
minority citizens and police since 1994.66 The concentration of African
Americans and Hispanics in public housing increased their exposure to the
aggressive police tactics of this era. In many African American communities, the
racial breach was an impediment to police-citizen cooperation. In public housing,
OSH extended these policing tactics to largely poor and nonwhite citizens,
62 “Operation Condor” was created during this era, an initiative of the New York City Police
Department that used overtime pay to motivate police officers to make “buy-and-bust” arrests for
drug offenses. The program produced thousands of arrests across the City, but its tactics raised
complaints from minority citizens about its racial disproportionality, and the excessive use of a
full criminal justice process (including the use of pretrial detention rather than summons) for lowlevel drug offenders whose crimes were mostly non-violent and who posed a minimal public
safety threat. The death of Patrick Dorismond, an unarmed citizen who was approached by
Condor officers who tried to sell him marijuana during an Operation Condor arrest, heightened
racial tensions between minority citizens and the police. Jeffrey Rosen, Excessive Force: Why
Patrick Dorismond Didn't Have to Die, The New Republic, Apr. 10, 2000, at 26; see also William
Rashbaum, Police Suspend Extra Patrols for 10 Days, N.Y. Times, Oct. 10, 2000, at B1.
63 Jeffrey Fagan, Drug Control in Public Housing, supra note 14. Key informants included 12
NYPD police officers from all PSA’s in the city, 13 tenant association leaders and providers of
DEP-funded social service programs within NYCHA.
64 Jeffrey Fagan, Drug Control in Public Housing, id.
65 Id, at __.
66 New York State Attorney General, 1999; David Kocieniewski, Success of Elite Police Unit
Exacts a Toll on the Streets, New York Times, February 15, 1999, at A1; Kit R. Roane, Minority
Private-School Students Claim Police Harassment, New York Times, March 26, 1999, at B5; Fagan
and Davies, id.
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weakening police-citizen cooperation to create the reciprocal social controls
essential to effective crime control. Many respondents complained that these
tactics tended to isolate citizens from the police, and offered no incentive for
citizens to engage with one another or with OSH or the police generally in the coproduction of security. Instead, citizens continued their reliance on formal social
control, and the difficult and delicate process of social capital development was
stillborn.
Many of these complaints applied equally to the Anti-Narcotic Strike
Force. At a time when the courts in New York City were returning to a
philosophy of individualized justice, and in a historical context when the courts
were reorganizing in most boroughs to provide drug treatment services and a
theory of therapeutic jurisprudence,67 the ANSF pursued an aggressive program
of prosecution of both petty and serious drug offenders in public housing.
Treatment was not a part of ANSF actions, which were focused on either the
removal of offending families from public housing or the incarceration of drug
offenders. Cases were brought against public housing tenants without discretion,
and with little attention to the individual context of the case or the potential
impact of prosecution on collateral parties. Nearly all incidents were processed
formally through one or more available legal routes. While some prosecutions
were seen by key informants as important weapons against well organized drug
dealers, the formality of ANSF also led to prosecutions of low-level users and
drug possessors whose incarceration or eviction was not seen as contributing
substantially to drug control or crime reduction.
DEP perhaps was a lost opportunity, both for innovation and for testing of
new ways to control and eliminate drug problems. Identifying the unique
contributions of DEP in an era of declining crime rates is difficult, and was
further complicated by its diffused implementation. Second, the blurring of lines
between everyday police patrol and OSH (especially post-merger) defeated efforts
to rigorously estimate the crime control effects of special policing in the PSA’s
and in the public housing sites. The narrow scope of interventions, inability to
distinguish DEP component from ongoing policies and tactics, and the generally
weak “dosage” of efforts or investment in social programs and tenant patrol
across the 184 public housing sites, formed a weak program that was barren of
vision, theory or execution. Public housing residents and key informants both
seemed to agree.

C. Social Norms and Drug Control in Public Housing

67 Drug treatment courts opened during this time in every borough except Manhattan. See,
Berman et al, Institutionalizing Innovation, supra note 13.
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There are realizable pathways to the original vision of DEP that offer the
promise of sustainable impacts that can accomplish both the suppression and
social developmental components of DEP. The pivotal kernel is a strategy that
brings citizens and police into closer collaboration to address problems of crime,
drugs and disorder. DEP offered no new vision of policing, and in fact, simply
intensified a policing and prosecution regime that was antagonistic to many
citizens.
The incentives for people to engage with legal actors in social regulation
and the co-production of security may lie in their evaluations of their treatment by
the police. Fairness and crackdowns may be inconsistent, but at least citizens
know they are tradeoffs. Recent work by Tom Tyler, based on a survey of
residents in three Oakland, California neighborhoods suggests that citizens’
evaluations of legal actors are not linked to the outcomes of their court cases or
interactions with police, or on the crime rate in their neighborhood.68 Tyler
focuses instead on the fairness of their treatment from those authorities. Ron
Weitzer reaches the same conclusion in a survey of residents of three
neighborhoods in Washington DC.69 He reports contrasting evaluations of police
services in two predominantly black neighborhoods. Proactive policing of
residents of a poor, high crime neighborhood elicited less favorable reactions to
police than did the more reactive and respectful treatment of citizens in an
“orderly” middle class neighborhood.70
Although the law is based on the implicit or explicit threat of sanctioning
for wrongdoing, the legal system depends heavily on voluntary compliance from
most citizens to set and enforce norms, and to engage with the police in social
control. Hence, lower levels of legitimacy make social regulation more costly and
difficult, both materially and politically. The police depend heavily on the
voluntary cooperation of citizens to fight crime. Citizens report crime and
criminals, informally help to police their neighborhoods, and aid the courts as
jurors and witnesses. Without these cooperative acts from the public, the police
risk being seen as an intrusive force imposing order. And without these acts, the
meaning of order becomes detached from its social basis and loses its moral
weight to influence others in the community.
A social norms approach would invite policing of drug problems in the
context of corresponding and contemporaneous extra-legal social initiatives aimed
68 Tom Tyler and Y. Huo, TRUST IN THE LAW: ENCOURAGING PUBLIC COOPERATION WITH THE
POLICE AND COURTS (2002) ; See, also,Tom R. Tyler, Public Trust And Confidence In Legal
Authorities: What Do People Want From The Law And Legal Institutions?, 19 Behavioral Science
and the Law 215 (2001).
69 Ronald Weitzer,. Racialized Policing: Residents’ Perceptions in Three Neighborhoods, 34 Law
& Soc’y Review 129 (2000)
70 Weitzer, Id.. Weitzer’s findings stand Broken Windows theory on its head by suggesting that
the police may be reacting to the visible cues of crime and disorder, not just would-be criminals
who might journey to a disorderly neighborhood to take advantage of crime opportunities.
Weitzer’s findings suggest that in neighborhoods with visible signs of disorder, police react with
indiscriminate and widespread patterns of aggressive stops and interdiction of citizens.
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at the same or parallel problems. These realistically balanced efforts reflect a
more complex view of the interaction of crime and drugs, one that recognizes
their spurious relationship to broader underlying social and physical conditions
within neighborhoods. While OSH and ANSF approaches might promote a
temporary reduction of crime through suppression, a legitimacy-focused approach
promotes construction of social networks that integrate community-level social
processes with the regulation of crime and disorder.

Table 1. Comparison of Social Indicators and Homicide Rates in New York City
Census Tracts with and without Public Housing Developments

Variable
Homicide (counts)*
% Households with Public Assistance Income±
Gini for Total Household Income
% Households Under Poverty Level
% High School Graduates - Total - 25+
% in Managerial, Professional, or Technical Jobs
Employment Rate
Labor Force Participation Rate
% Nonwhite
Racial Fragmentation Index
% Female Headed Households with Children < 18
Supervision Ratio (25-64 by 5-24)
% Youth Population (5-15)
Population
Residential Mobility - Same House as 5 Years Ago
% Foreign Born
% Linguistic Isolation
Vacancy Rate
% Occupied Units that are Rentals
% Tracts Containing Public Housing
Public Housing Population
% Tract Population comprised of Public Housing

Tracts With
Public Housing
Mean
SD
1.87
1.29
31.54
13.36
0.47
0.04
38.39
13.76
51.20
12.95
20.91
10.83
83.32
6.72
50.97
9.31
85.74
22.67
0.45
0.15
21.56
10.28
1.60
0.90
20.28
6.05
4885
2603
66.42
8.92
17.05
12.19
12.25
9.69
4.38
4.34
90.69
10.41
10.56
1801
37.37

Tracts without
Public Housing
Mean
SD
0.53
0.75
11.65 11.54
0.36
0.09
15.63 13.23
68.16 15.75
30.75 15.28
91.11
6.64
61.81 11.24
51.14 35.71
0.37
0.20
8.70
9.55
2.52
2.16
14.02
6.50
3118
2381
62.51 12.08
28.56 14.98
10.80 10.17
5.67
6.08
61.99 25.48

1661
25.63

* Homicide measures are average for 1985-96 period. Per capita rates show similar
differences: .41 per 1,000 persons in public housing tracts, .19 per 1,000 persons in tracts
without public housing.
± Indicators are calculated from 1990 Census Data, which is midpoint of 1985-96 study
interval.
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Figure 1. Homicide Rates in NYC Census Tracts
With and Without Public Housing, 1986-96
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Source: Injury Prevention Program, New York City Department of Health and Mental Hygiene, various years

Table 2. NYCHA Population, Household Size and Population Characteristics, 1985-96 (N=184)

Year

Persons per
Total
Total
Population Families Household

% Seniors

% Families
on Welfare

Average
Residency
(years)

%
White

%
Population
below 10

%
Population
10-17

1985

447,944

160,545

2.79

11.9

27.5

13.3

9.3

17.5

19.7

1986

441,483

160,481

2.75

12.3

27.6

13.8

9.1

17.7

19.2

1987

434,763

159,915

2.72

12.4

27.5

14.4

8.8

17.8

19.0

1988

432,160

159,152

2.72

12.5

28.6

14.9

8.4

18.3

18.8

1989

422,445

159,974

2.64

13.4

28.6

14.9

7.6

18.3

17.5

1990

422,347

160,578

2.63

13.6

29.3

15.4

7.4

19.1

17.6

1991

424,308

160,162

2.65

13.5

30.3

15.7

7.0

19.1

17.6

1992

410,586

159,207

2.58

13.2

30.9

15.0

6.4

20.6

17.6

1993

413,923

160,029

2.59

13.2

31.1

16.2

6.4

20.6

17.5

1994

399,822

156,042

2.56

13.3

31.1

16.7

6.2

20.6

17.9

1995

391,420

153,936

2.54

13.4

31.0

17.1

6.0

20.5

18.2

1996

392,430

155,325

2.53

13.4

30.1

17.1

5.9

20.4

17.8

Source: New York City Housing Authority, Annual Tenant Recertification Surveys, various years
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Table 3. DEP Annual Budget by Program Components, 1991-96
Programs
Operation Safe Home
Tenant Patrol
Anti-Narcotics Strike Force
Drug Abuse Contracts
Treatment Services
Drug Prevention
Drug Abuse Treatment
Domestic Violence Program
Resident Programs
Community Center Programs
Youth Sports Programming
Anti-Graffiti
Seasonal Jobs Program
Summer Youth Employment
Parenting Skills
Career Training
Streetworker
City Scouts
Drug Elimination Staff
Grants Administration
Partners in Reading
D.A.R.E./G.R.E.A.T.
Security Repair Team
Security Repair Materials
Physical Improvements
Police Equipment
Total

1991
$4,222,697
59,371
76,186
4,171,410
838,544

750,000
1,276,448

188,898

1992

1993

1994

1995

1996

$22,030,824
1,136,995
648,603

$19,441,604
1,265,038
1,060,803

$4,417,763
76,547
122,677

$7,395,957
178,055
82,482

$14,040,143
165,000
978,781

2,680,339
1,325,224

2,033,244

1,329,826

395,000
2,810,786

109,298
2,773,627
80,926

1,034,117
1,040,548
2,436,709

24,948
1,388,870
248,148

94,305
5,211,291
3,025,849

605,000

819,216
1,198,470

10,622,000

8,445,052

1,406,013
6,123,174

969,381
1,518,993

1,211,636
1,110,179

78,997
5,769,208

1,862,234

127,790
334,005

243,176

671,876
65,000

150,000

167,921
182,105
97,976

294,000
118,000
$38,827,377

$40,578,147

$35,000,000

249,700
531,522

$12,698,781

$15,035,363

$15,500,837

Table 4. Annual Budget Allocation by DEP Program Components, 1991-99 ($M)
Program Type

Year

Operation
Safe Home

Tenant
Patrol

AntiNarcotics
Strike Force

1991

4.223

0.059

0.076

5.010

2.549

0.781

12.699

1992

4.418

0.077

0.123

4.006

6.413

0.000

15.035

1993

7.396

0.178

0.082

2.033

5.811

0.000

15.501

1994

14.040

0.165

0.979

1.330

21.902

0.412

38.827

1995

22.031

1.137

0.649

1.034

15.728

0.000

40.578

1996

19.442

1.265

1.061

0.917

12.315

0.000

35.000

71.55

2.88

2.97

14.33

64.718

1.193

157.64

45.3

1.83

1.88

9.1

41.05

0.08

100

Total
Percent

Drug Abuse
Treatment and
Prevention

Social and
Community
Services

Security
Equipment

Total

Source: NYCHA PHDEP Income and Expense Reports, Phase II - Phase IX, reported between 12/31/95 to 12/31/99.
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Table 5. Social Structural Characteristics of New York City Census Tracts and
Police Precincts, 1990
Variable
% Households with Public Assistance Income
Gini for Total Household Income
% Households Under Poverty Level
% High School Graduates - Total - 25+
% in Managerial, Professional, or Technical Jobs
Employment Rate
Labor Force Participation Rate
% Nonwhite
Racial Fragmentation Index
% Female Headed Households with Children < 18
Supervision Ratio (25-64 by 5-24)
% Youth Population (5-15)
Population
Residential Mobility - Same House 5 Years Ago
% Foreign Born
% Linguistic Isolation
Vacancy Rate
% Occupied Units that are Rentals

Tracts
Mean
13.03
0.38
18.91

SD
11.95
0.08
14.22

Precincts
Mean
SD
14.26
10.87
0.40
0.07
20.99
12.50

66.16
29.73
90.32
59.65
56.49
0.39
10.44
2.29
15.33
3446
62.91
28.67
11.10

15.48
14.78
6.01
9.52
35.28
0.18
9.53
1.35
6.13
2312
9.42
14.65
9.47

66.57
32.45
89.93
60.01
59.05
0.48
11.02
2.27
14.93
95524
61.94
27.10
11.43

14.36
14.90
4.53
8.01
29.99
0.15
8.27
1.13
5.58
43237
5.41
12.51
8.18

5.51
65.82

4.43
25.02

6.01
73.97

3.08
18.18

Source: STF3A, STF3C Census Files for 1980-2000. Results are shown for 1990 only

Table 6. Social and Economic Characteristics of NYCHA
Residents and Developments, 1986-95
Variable
Income
% Minors (Under Age 21)
% Seniors (Age 62 and Older)
% Families Receiving Welfare
% Families with One Parent and Children < 18
% Families with 2 or more Persons Employed
Racial Fragmentation Index
Tenure
Number of Buildings

Mean
12525
43.49
13.75
29.35
21.28
4.56
0.46
15.53
10.47

SD
3537
7.92
7.63
12.11
9.76
3.49
0.15
3.56
9.28

Source: New York City Housing Authority, Annual Resident Certification Surveys,
various years
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Table 7. Principle Components Factor Analysis, New York City Census Tracts & Police Precincts, 1990
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Tracts

Factor
Poverty/Inequality
% Households Under Poverty Level
% Households with Public Assistance Income
Gini for Total Household Income

Component Eigenvalue
2.65

Segregation
Racial Fragmentation Index
% Nonwhite

0.805
0.805

Immigration
Linguistic Isolation
Foreign Born
Housing Structure
%Occupied Units that are Rentals
Vacancy Rate

Component

88.5

2.79

92.9

67.2

3.33

83.4

1.09

54.7

2.38

79.3

1.33

66.4

1.61

80.3

1.18

58.8

0.942
0.895
0.899
0.915
1.30

64.8
0.739
0.739

2.27

75.6

0.937
0.847

0.917
0.844

-0.819

-0.909
1.04

51.9

0.720
0.720

0.815
0.815
1.53

76.7

0.876
0.876

0.896
0.896
1.15

0.757
0.757

%
Explained
Eigenvalue Variance

0.980
0.941
0.971
2.69

0.929
0.836
0.774
0.726

Anonymity
Population - 1990
Residential Mobility - Same House as 1985

% Explained
Variance

0.971
0.940
0.909

Labor Market/Human Capital
% High School Graduates - Total - 25+
% in Managerial, Professional, Technical Jobs
Employment Rate
Labor Force Participation Rate

Supervision
%Youth Population (5-15)
% Female Headed Households with Children
Under 18
Supervision Ratio (25-64 by 5-24)

Precincts

57.3
0.767
0.767

Table 8. Factor Composition – NYCHA Public Housing (1990)*
Factor
Public Housing Poverty
% Families Receiving Welfare
Income
Public Housing Social Control
% Minors (Under Age 21)
% Families with One Parent and Children Under
18

Component

Eigenvalue

%
Explained
Variance

1.71

85.5

1.84

91.8

0.925
-0.925
0.958
0.958

* Factor scores computed for each year from 1985-96, 1990 shown as illustration.
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Table 9a. Mixed Effects Poisson Regression of DEP Effects on Violent Crime Rates, New York City Police
Precincts, 1986-96
Effect
Intercept
Time
2
Time
DEP
Operation Safe Homes
Tenant Patrols
Number of Public Housing Sites
% Population in Public Housing
Drug Possession Arrests (logged)
Drug Sale Arrests (logged)
Endogeneity
Precinct Social Characteristics
Population (Logged)
Poverty
Human Capital
Segregation
Social Control - Supervision
Social Control - Anonymity
Immigration
Housing
DEP Interactions
DEP*Poverty
DEP*Human Capital
DEP*Segregation
DEP*Supervision
DEP*Anonymity
DEP*Immigration
DEP*Housing
Model Statistics: -2LL

DEP Binary
t
p(t)
2.38
0.020
13.25
0.000
-13.18
-5.55

0.000
0.000

DEP Investment
t
p(t)
1.27
0.209
12.61
0.000
-12.29
-9.10

0.000
0.000

DEP Components
t
p(t)
0.60
0.550
5.63
0.000
-5.35

0.000
0.000
0.057
0.002
0.001
0.099
0.723
0.000
0.000
0.034
0.014
0.000
0.276
0.536
0.548
0.000

-1.39
1.55
-3.81
1.16
11.13

0.164
0.122
0.000
0.248
0.000

-2.39
2.47
-0.96
2.56
15.22

0.018
0.014
0.339
0.011
0.000

-13.36
1.94
-3.14
3.27
1.66
0.36
15.34

3.06
3.60
3.16
2.68
1.92
0.27
1.03
4.15

0.002
0.000
0.002
0.008
0.055
0.787
0.305
0.000

5.83
2.01
2.35
5.92
0.41
0.29
0.21
5.75

0.000
0.046
0.020
0.000
0.685
0.770
0.832
0.000

6.58
2.15
2.50
5.65
1.09
-0.62
0.60
6.47

-0.07
0.944
0.25
0.805
1.50
0.135
-0.38
0.708
0.52
0.605
-0.26
0.796
-0.91
0.365
-827.00

-0.33
0.739
-0.49
0.626
-0.80
0.422
0.75
0.454
-1.23
0.220
-0.90
0.367
-1.24
0.215
-301.7

-1.06
0.290
-0.58
0.563
-0.29
0.769
1.62
0.107
-1.43
0.156
-1.78
0.077
-0.77
0.441
-473.2

Table 9b. Mixed Effects Poisson Regression of DEP Effects on Property Crime Rates, New York City
Police Precincts, 1986-96
Effect
Intercept
Time
Time2
DEP
Operation Safe Homes
Tenant Patrols
Number of Public Housing Sites
% Population in Public Housing
Drug Possession Arrests (logged)
Drug Sale Arrests (logged)
Endogeneity

DEP Dummy
t
p(t)
1.71
0.091
9.71
0.000
-9.76
-6.91

0.000
0.000

DEP Investments
t
p(t)
-2.59
0.012
13.30
0.000
-12.85
-11.19

DEP Components
t
p(t)
5.56
0.000
-5.13
0.000

0.000
0.000

-1.61
1.32
-3.08
-1.16
10.28

0.108
0.187
0.002
0.248
0.000

-0.15
-0.69
-1.56
1.67
19.19

0.878
0.488
0.120
0.097
0.000

-13.91
4.12
-0.31
-0.63
0.54
-0.35
19.42

Precinct Social Characteristics
Population (Logged)
Poverty
Human Capital
Segregation
Social Control - Supervision
Social Control - Anonymity
Immigration
Housing

3.43
3.76
4.62
0.66
-0.89
0.33
1.50
-1.05

0.001
0.000
0.000
0.507
0.374
0.742
0.133
0.292

9.77
-1.32
-0.70
1.18
-3.24
-1.93
0.27
3.29

0.000
0.188
0.485
0.239
0.001
0.054
0.788
0.001

10.49
-1.36
-0.90
1.36
-3.59
-2.54
0.18
3.60

DEP Interactions
DEP*Poverty
DEP*Human Capital
DEP*Segregation
SEP*Supervision
DEP*Anonymity
DEP*Immigration
DEP*Housing
Model Statistics: -2LL

-0.75
-0.32
1.19
-0.12
1.05
-0.67
0.73
-637.8

0.454
0.746
0.235
0.908
0.292
0.506
0.467

-0.39
0.700
-0.78
0.435
1.45
0.150
-0.52
0.603
-1.15
0.253
-1.18
0.238
-0.53
0.596
-314.20

0.000
0.000
0.754
0.531
0.589
0.727
0.000
0.000
0.176
0.372
0.178
0.001
0.012
0.855
0.001

-0.34
0.738
-0.79
0.432
1.19
0.238
-0.45
0.654
-1.81
0.072
-1.17
0.245
-0.81
0.421
-433.40
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Table 10. Mixed Effects Poisson Regression of DEP Effects on Homicide Counts, New York City
Census Tracts, 1985-96
Effect
Intercept
Time
Time2
DEP
Operation Safe Homes
Tenant Patrols
Public Housing Dummy
Drug Arrests - Sale
Drug Arrests - Possession
Spatial Lag
Endogeneity
Population (Logged)
Poverty
Human Capital
Segregation
Social Control - Supervision
Social Control - Anonymity
Immigration
Housing
DEP Interactions
DEP*Poverty
DEP*Human Capital
DEP*Segregation
DEP*Supervision
DEP*Anonymity
DEP*Immigration
DEP*Housing
Model Statistics: -2LL

DEP Binary
t
p(t)
-38.46
0.000
15.33
0.000
-14.59
-11.91

0.000
0.000

-2.58
3.59
0.18
12.17
14.45
33.48
4.85
-1.52
15.76
8.78
-2.41
-8.69
3.60

0.010
0.000
0.855
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.128
0.000
0.000
0.016
0.000
0.000

-1.45
-0.31
0.86
1.96
3.04
-0.70
-0.02

0.148
0.755
0.389
0.050
0.002
0.482
0.987
84199.0

DEP Investment
t
p(t)
-27.40
0.000
4.33
0.000
-4.25
-6.16

-1.75
2.73
2.76
12.85
22.97
24.97
0.36
-0.89
8.44
5.81
-0.93
-4.30
2.71

0.000
0.000

0.080
0.006
0.006
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.720
0.372
0.000
0.000
0.350
0.000
0.007

0.09
0.926
-0.02
0.988
-0.94
0.349
0.13
0.897
0.52
0.601
-0.32
0.752
-0.17
0.868
38844.8

DEP Components
t
p(t)
-26.34
0.000
1.29
0.197
-1.25

0.213

-4.50
1.23
-1.70
2.62
2.91
12.68
22.53
25.03
0.45
-0.82
8.55
5.63
-0.61
-4.23
2.57

0.000
0.219
0.089
0.009
0.004
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.652
0.412
0.000
0.000
0.544
0.000
0.010

-0.11
-0.12
-1.15
0.29
0.02
-0.19
-0.03

0.916
0.903
0.252
0.772
0.980
0.846
0.978
38813.2

Table 11a. Mixed Effects Poisson Regression of DEP Effects on Reported Violent Crime Rates, NYCHA
Developments, 1986-94
Effects
Intercept
Time
2
Time
DEP
Operation Safe Homes
Tenant Patrols
Drug Possession Arrests (log)
Drug Sale Arrests (log)
Precinct Property Crime Rate
Endogeneity

DEP Binary
t
p(t)

DEP Investment
t
p(t)

DEP Components
t
p(t)

-19.79
0.80

0.000
0.427

-12.85
2.14

0.000
0.033

-1.97
-0.46

0.050
0.649

-2.30
1.22

0.021
0.225

-0.94
-0.08

0.350
0.933

0.54

0.586
0.606
0.433
0.003
0.783
0.000
0.000

-1.68
3.40
5.73
9.24

0.092
0.001
0.000
0.000

-2.85
0.34
3.52
8.70

0.005
0.735
0.001
0.000

-0.52
-0.79
-2.95
0.28
3.59
8.70

PH Development Characteristics
Population (log)
Poverty
Supervision Ratio (Seniors/Minors)
Employed (2 or more persons in HH)
Tenure
Racial Heterogeneity

33.55
1.69
11.38
-1.87
2.71
-1.32

0.000
0.091
0.000
0.061
0.007
0.187

28.97
1.85
2.73
-0.41
-0.10
0.17

0.000
0.064
0.007
0.685
0.920
0.862

28.86
1.70
2.86
-0.43
-0.01
0.26

0.000
0.090
0.005
0.670
0.990
0.795

DEP Interactions
DEP * Poverty
DEP * Supervision
DEP * Employment
DEP * Tenure
DEP * Racial Fragmentation

2.30
-4.22
-1.09
-0.69
-1.40

0.022
0.000
0.277
0.493
0.163

0.86
-0.76
-0.32
0.51
-1.97

0.391
0.446
0.748
0.611
0.049

0.92
-0.85
-0.32
0.45
-1.98

0.359
0.397
0.751
0.650
0.049

Model Statistics: -2LL

2096.40

1393.7

1393.7
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Table 11b. Mixed Effects Poisson Regression of DEP Effects on Reported Property Crime Rate, NYCHA
Developments, 1986-94
DEP Binary
Effects
Intercept
Time

DEP Investment
t

p(t)

DEP Components

t

p(t)

t

p(t)

-11.90
1.66

0.000
0.097

-9.38
2.59

0.000
0.010

-1.30
-0.09

0.196
0.927

-9.41
-1.38

0.000
0.168

-0.86
-0.84

0.388
0.403

0.26

0.798
0.739
0.892
0.272
0.625
0.168
0.000

Time2
DEP
Operation Safe Homes
Tenant Patrols
Drug Possession Arrests (log)
Drug Sale Arrests (log)
Precinct Property Crime Rate
Endogeneity

0.29
-0.28
0.00
8.47

0.774
0.781
0.999
0.000

-1.25
-0.53
-1.35
6.84

0.213
0.596
0.178
0.000

-0.33
0.14
-1.10
-0.49
-1.38
6.87

PH Development Characteristics
Population (log)
Poverty
Supervision Ratio (Seniors/Minors)
Employed (2 or more persons in HH)
Tenure
Racial Heterogeneity

29.61
2.75
3.08
-3.39
0.55
-4.73

0.000
0.006
0.002
0.001
0.581
0.000

25.45
2.90
-1.94
0.68
-1.01
0.66

0.000
0.004
0.053
0.499
0.315
0.508

25.55
3.02
-2.10
0.70
-1.10
0.65

0.000
0.003
0.037
0.485
0.273
0.517

1.52
-1.54
0.98
1.05
1.83

0.129
0.125
0.328
0.292
0.068
2523.2

-1.02
1.29
-0.66
-0.46
-1.44

0.310
0.197
0.507
0.648
0.151

-1.08
1.38
-0.68
-0.41
-1.48

0.279
0.168
0.496
0.683
0.140
1676.3

DEP Interactions
DEP * Poverty
DEP * Supervision
DEP * Employment
DEP * Tenure
DEP * Racial Fragmebtation
Model Statistics: -2LL

1697.7

Table 12. Summary of DEP Effects at Three Spatial Aggregations
DEP Binary
DEP Investment
t
p(t)
t
p(t)
Police Precincts
Violent Crimes
Operation Safe Home
Tenant Patrols
Property Crimes
Operation Safe Home
Tenant Patrols
Census Tracts
Homicide Victimizations
Operation Safe Home
Tenant Patrols
Public Housing Developments
Violent Crimes
Operation Safe Home
Tenant Patrols
Property Crimes
Operation Safe Home
Tenant Patrols

-5.55

-6.91

-11.91

1.22

-1.38

0.000

0.000

0.000

0.225

0.168

-9.10

-11.19

-6.16

-0.08

-0.84

DEP Components
t
p(t)

0.000
-13.36
1.94

0.000
0.057

-13.91
4.12

0.000
0.000

-4.50
1.23

0.000
0.219

-0.52
-0.79

0.606
0.433

-0.33
0.14

0.739
0.892

0.000

0.000

0.933

0.403

All models controlled for social and economic contexts, crime rates in surrounding areas, time (quadratic), and interactions
of DEP indicator with contextual factors

